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Selling a Piece of the Farm Credit System
Robert W. Jolly and Josh D. Roe
On July 30, 2004, the Directors of Farm Credit Services
of America (FCSA), an association of the farmer-owned
cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS), announced that
they had agreed to a purchase offer from Rabobank, an in-
ternational financial services company headquartered in
the Netherlands. This announcement set off howls of pro-
test from within the FCS and from some FCSA members
and public officials. It was also greeted with restrained glee
by some bankers and other FCSA members. Three months
later, the FCSA Board terminated the sale negotiation.
Shortly thereafter, their CEO resigned and the board fol-
lowed up with several full-page ads in local newspapers
pledging their (and management’s) commitment to mem-
bers and to the principles of cooperation. In demonstra-
tion of their renewed commitment, the Board recently an-
nounced patronage programs for 2004 and 2005—the
first ever by this association.
Unexpected and unprecedented events are generally
interesting in their own right. But they also give us an op-
portunity to examine long-held views and plumb what lies
beneath the surface in markets, institutions and public
policy. The Rabobank/FCSA deal is one of those seismic
events.
The Players in Brief
Sometimes you do need a scorecard to tell the players
apart. Here are thumbnail sketches of the major players in-
volved in the Rabobank/FCSA deal.
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is a nationwide farmer-
owned and -governed financial cooperative. It currently
provides $95 billion in short- and long-term loans to
farmers, ranchers, fishermen, rural home owners, agricul-
tural processing and marketing operations, farm-related
businesses, farmer-owned cooperatives, rural utilities, and
certain foreign and domestic entities engaged in interna-
tional agricultural trade. Loans are funded not by deposits
but rather through the sale of FCS securities in global
money markets. The FCS was chartered and initially capi-
talized by the federal government following passage of the
Federal Farm Loan Act in 1916. The motivation for creat-
ing the FCS was to provide a source of credit for agricul-
tural mortgages at rates and terms that banks would not or
could not meet—whether due to cost or inadequate com-
petition. Although the FCS now provides a wide range of
financial services to its designated customer base, slightly
more than 50% of its business still comes from agricultural
real estate lending. Since the FCS is a creation of the feder-
al government, it is both a business and an instrument of
public policy. It is privately owned (all public equity had
been repaid by the 1960s) and governed by its members.
But it is considered an instrumentality of the federal gov-
ernment when it sells securities. All income from agricul-
tural real estate loans is tax-exempt. The size of the FCS,
its collective liability for its debt, and its historical ties to
the federal government result in an “implied guarantee” on
its securities if the assets of the Farm Credit System Insur-
ance Corporation were to be exhausted. This permits the
FCS to borrow funds at a cost only slightly above the fed-
eral government. In exchange for these benefits, the FCS is
required to serve exclusively rural and agricultural credit
markets. The rationale for this bargain has been to ensure
that credit is available to rural markets that might be aban-
doned by banks or other commercial lenders.
The FCS is organized into five regional banks. The re-
gional banks fund a variety of associations serving smaller
geographic markets. Farm Credit Services of America is an
association of the FCS. It is funded by Agribank, FCB, lo-
cated in St. Paul, Minnesota. FCSA provides approximate-
ly $7.7 billion in loans to farmers and rural home owners
in Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The
FCSA is owned and governed by about 53,000 members.
(45,000 have voting rights.) The members are represented
by a 17-member board. Following cooperative principles,
FCSA is owned by those who use it and is governed on a
one member, one vote basis.20 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
Rabobank Group is a century-old
member-owned bank based in the
Netherlands. Its historical roots re-
semble those of the Farm Credit Sys-
tem. It was started in response to ru-
ral credit problems in the
Netherlands. Farm and agribusiness
lending constitute a long-standing
core competency. Rabobank oper-
ates in 38 countries with an asset base
(at the end of 2003) of approximately
$500 billion. Rabobank has operat-
ed in the United States for the past
23 years specializing in agribusiness
lending. However, in 2002 Ra-
bobank began to implement their
“country banking” strategy with a
broader focus on production agricul-
ture and rural credit markets. In fair-
ly rapid succession, they acquired
Valley Independent Bank in Califor-
nia, Lendlease Agribusiness Division
in Missouri, and Ag Services of
America in Iowa. These acquisitions
gave them toeholds in rural commu-
nity banking, agricultural real estate,
and agricultural input financing, re-
spectively. Rabobank’s country bank-
ing strategy has been successfully im-
plemented in a number of countries.
For example, in 1994 Rabobank ac-
quired the Primary Industry Bank of
Australia (PIBA), an established lend-
er with a comfortable loan portfolio.
Since acquisition, Rabobank has sig-
nificantly expanded its lending activi-
ties more broadly throughout the
country and the agricultural and agri-
business sector. Rabobank continues
to finance food and agribusiness
firms in Australia as well. A similar
pattern of acquisition and growth in
rural, food, and agribusiness financial
markets has been implemented re-
cently in New Zealand and Ireland.
Rabobank has fostered a reputation
as a committed agricultural lender
with exceptional safety and sound-
ness ratings.
The Farm Credit Administration
(FCA) is the regulatory agency for
the FCS. Its primary role in oversee-
ing the Rabobank/FCSA transaction
was to ensure adherence to the legal
process required for an FCS bank or
association to leave the FCS and to
approve or disapprove the proposal.
If approved by FCA, the proposal
would then be submitted to the
FCSA stockholders for vote. 
The Offer
So, here is the deal. Initially, Ra-
bobank offered current FCSA mem-
bers a $600 million cash buyout for
the assets of the association—loans,
personnel, customer base, and facili-
ties. The payment would be allocated
based on current patronage or out-
standing loan balances. This cash of-
fer was eventually increased to $750
million. An exit fee of approximately
$800 million would be paid to the
FCS Insurance Corporation from
FCSA surplus. The calculation of the
exit fee is specified in the 1987 Farm
Credit Act and is based on an associa-
tion’s capital relative to its assets. It
can be viewed as a payment for the
benefits received by the association
for being part of the system. In addi-
tion, Rabobank would need to pay
off the $6.2 billion credit line from
Agribank funding FCSA’s existing
loan portfolio. 
Good Deal or Not?
At the time the deal was announced,
the directors identified a number of
benefits for FCSA members:
• a broader set of financial services,
including access to international
markets;
• competitive cost of funds due to
Rabobank’s AAA credit rating
and size;
• a cash payout from FCSA capital
surplus; and
• an opportunity to slip the bonds
of the FCS and to serve a broader
array of rural households and
businesses.
Opponents to the sale also ex-
pressed concern that:
• Most of the financial services that
Rabobank could offer were or
could be offered by FCSA.
• The FCSA could develop a
patronage program—as most
FCS associations have already
done. Patronage programs would
serve as an alternative means for
member/borrowers to share in
the earnings of their cooperative.
• The cash offer was too low, given
FCSA’s assets and earnings.
• The current members would
obtain the cash from the sale, but
because it wasn’t clear how much
of the cooperative’s capital was
due to the patronage of former
members, the former members
would be out of luck.
• The exiting association would
leave a significant hole in the
FCS that the FCA would be
required to fill either by expand-
ing the territory of existing asso-
ciations or chartering a new
association. Resources for either
option might have to partially
come from equity contributions
of other FCS banks and associa-
tions.
• If FCSA were allowed to secede, a
mass exodus of other associations
could follow.
• Rabobank, although ostensibly
committed to agriculture, would
be free to follow profit opportu-
nities in any market. This com-
mitment to rural finance would
be much more flexible than the
legislation governing the FCS.
• Finally, many FCSA members
were concerned about the loss of
control over an organization that1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 21
they had built and relied on for
nearly 80 years.
Why Sell When You Can Merge?
Shortly after the Rabobank/FCSA
deal was announced, AgStar, another
Agricultural Credit Association serv-
ing parts of Minnesota and Wiscon-
sin, presented the FCSA directors
with a merger proposal. The merger
offer included a cash payout to FCSA
members of $650 million and con-
solidation of administrative offices.
Further, because this was a merger
and not an exit, the exit fee would be
avoided. However, the FCSA board
rejected the AgStar offer at the same
time as the termination proposal.
What Were They Thinking?
The Rabobank and FCSA folks are
no dummies. Yet, this deal is vaguely
reminiscent of the introduction of
New Coke. The negative reaction
from many members, as well as parts
of the agricultural community, was
quick and strong and seemed to
catch the proponents of the sale off
guard. Rabobank’s stated objective in
purchasing the FCSA was to enter a
new rural credit market. This strategy
of enter, transform, and expand has
played out reasonably well in other
markets. In singling out the FCSA,
was Rabobank attracted to the mar-
ket? The firm? Or was it an opportu-
nity for a bargain? The answer, it
seems, is all of the above.
Figure 1 traces the current value
of farm operator assets and debt in
the FCSA trade area. Note that since
the end of the 1980s, nominal credit
volume has grown steadily but slow-
ly—around 3% annually. Also note
that outstanding non-real estate debt
is nearly equal to real estate debt in
this market. And because the value of
farm assets has increased at a much
greater rate than debt, nominal net
worth (and hence potential collater-
al) has grown significantly. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the changes
in market share for major lenders
serving the short- and long-term
markets in the FCSA trade area.
Commercial banks are clearly the
dominant non-real estate lender. The
FCS and other (mostly nontradition-
al) lenders have made some inroads
in recent years. One of the most
striking features of the real estate
market is the gain in market share
achieved by commercial banks—
from dead last in the early 1980s to
the top of the heap 15 years later.
A quick perusal of this informa-
tion reveals a mature market—slow
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growth in credit volume with existing
firms battling for market share. The
apparent winners of this zero-sum
game are the banks. FCSA’s total
farm debt market penetration is rela-
tively low—less than 22% in the
four-state area compared with about
50% for banks in 2004. This con-
trasts with FCS penetration national-
ly of 30% and more than 40% in
some markets such as Michigan or
Ohio. Keep in mind, too, that many
of the commercial banks serving this
market are small closely held busi-
nesses. Small size imparts higher
costs, loan limits, and a reliance on
local deposits—hardly strategic as-
sets for a mature market.
Was FCSA a plum to be picked?
In Table 1 we compare financial
characteristics of FCSA with two
other associations. Farm Credit Ser-
vices of Mid-America serves farmers
in the eastern Corn Belt and is
roughly the same size as FCSA. Ag-
Star is smaller, but has had a patron-
age program in place for the past few
years. Again, a quick look suggests
that FCSA’s performance measures
are generally weaker than the other
two associations. In particular, note
that FSCA earned a lower return on
its assets and member capital. The
lower charge-off rates, while admira-
ble for being low, may indicate a
rather conservative lending philoso-
phy. This is supported by the fact
that FCSA tended to favor real estate
lending. Non-interest expense is
higher, despite the fact that real estate
lending is usually a lower cost busi-
ness compared to short-term lending.
And, FCSA is certainly sitting on a
pile of capital.
Finally, FCSA could have been
attractive because it was offered at a
favorable price. Space doesn’t permit
a complete discussion of this topic.
However, capitalizing earnings can
suggest a value. In Table 2 we show
capitalized values for a range of in-
comes and required rates of return.
As a reference point, we use $115
million (the average income for
FCSA for the past three years) and a
nominal return of 12%. The analysis
is very simple—but it does suggest
that a $600 or $750 million offer
might have been a tad low.
Seismology
There is no question that the Ra-
bobank/FCSA deal shook up farm-
ers, lenders, and public officials. A
number of questions stemming from
this transaction merit consideration
and answers:
If FCSA is attractive to a private
firm, are the various legislative and
tax preferences granted to the FCS
justified? Or have changes in farm
Table 1. Average financial measures, 





































































Wages/assets 0.85% 0.39% 1.14%
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structure and information technolo-
gy moved us to a point where the tra-
ditional problems of rural credit mar-
kets—distance and information—no
longer require unique institutions or
policies? The same questions arise
simply from the growth in real estate
backed lending by banks. If deposit-
based lenders can profitably make ag-
ricultural land loans, is government-
sponsored enterprise status still need-
ed for the FCS?
Do rural credit markets need in-
creased competition? Most lenders,
particularly community bankers,
would argue that they have to work
hard enough as it is to attract depos-
its and originate loans. Nonetheless,
agricultural lending remains a frag-
mented industry, and fragmented in-
dustries frequently leave money on
the table. Rabobank’s interest in this
market suggests there could be some
gains from further consolidation.
Organizations generally don’t
spend much time working on proce-
dures for events that they don’t think
will occur. The FCA regulations and
the FCSA’s bylaws that govern exit
from the FCS appear to be incom-
plete. Two major stumbling blocks
arose as a result of the FCSA pur-
chase. The statutorily required exit
fee did not appear to reflect the full
value of the benefits an association
derives from being part of the FCS.
And, because the association had not
had an earnings patronage program
in the past, there was no way to link
property rights of former members to
the capital surplus and the earning
potential of the association. 
Some financial cooperatives such
as the FCS (or credit unions, for that
matter) do not pay patronage (two
thirds of FCS associations do pay pa-
tronage). The benefits to members in
lieu of patronage may appear in other
forms—lower loan rates, more office
locations, or better-trained person-
nel, for example. But an unwilling-
ness to pay patronage dividends can
create an unaccountable cash flow
that may result in expense preferenc-
es and other managerial mischief. In
fairness, following the 1987 bailout
of the FCS, a growing capital surplus
was a goal of the system so that gov-
ernment assistance could be repaid
and the FCA could be assured that
none would be required in the future.
If some capital is good, perhaps more
is better. However, patronage alloca-
tion of at least some earnings can be
accomplished along with goals for
capital growth. It is clear that man-
agement of FCS capital and patron-
age needs a careful look.
Effective governance is critical in
both cooperatives and investor-
owned firms—as the stockholders of
Enron will surely attest. When direc-
tors and their hired managers take ac-
tions that produce an uproar on the
part of members or investors, both
the governance process, as well as its
performance, need to be carefully re-
viewed and strengthened. Coopera-
tive boards, in particular, must work
to overcome an inherent conflict of
interest, because they are members
who represent members.
Finally, perhaps the time has
come to take FCS off its leash. The
FCS might trade off its tax preferenc-
es and instrumentality status for the
freedom to seek opportunities in a
broader market. The FCS is unique
because it is a financially strong co-
operative with a national infrastruc-
ture and reach, 80 years of rural lend-
ing experience, and an enviable
ability to source loanable funds.
With those assets and a rural credit
market that appears to offer some op-
portunities, the FCS may be ideally
suited to compete on a leveled play-
ing field to the benefit of rural Amer-
ica. Such a bold stroke, however,
should only be considered if the his-
torical mission that underlies the cre-
ation of the FCS could be assured—
the dependable and permanent sup-
ply of credit for all segments of the
agricultural sector.
Links
• Farm Credit Services: http://
www.farmcredit.com







• Farm Credit Services of Mid-
America: http://www.e-farm-
credit.com/Default.aspx?2-18




The authors would like to thank
John Moore, Farm Credit Adminis-
tration, Roger Ginder and Neil Harl,
Iowa State University, and John Pen-
son, Texas A&M, for valuable sug-
gestions.
For More Information
Barry, P.J. (2004). FCS of America’s 
organizational choices: Sale to 
Rabobank, merger with AgStar or 
Status Quo? University of Illinois. 
Available on the World Wide 
Web: http://www.farm-
Table 2. Estimated bank value ($ 
million).
Required rate of 





















9 5.8 1,897 1,983 2,069
12 8.7 1,264 1,322 1,379





Jolly, R.W., Ginder, R.G., & Harl, 
N.E. (2004). Understanding the 
proposed sale of Farm Credit Ser-
vices of America. Ames, IA: Iowa 
State University. Available on the 
World Wide Web: http://
www.econ.iastate.edu/rabobank-
buyout/.
Novack, N., & Henderson, J. 
(2004). Termination of the 
Rabobank and Farm Credit Ser-
vices of America sale. The Main 
Street Economist. Center for the 
Study of Rural America, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 




Robert W. Jolly is a professor and
Joshua D. Roe is graduate research
assistant in the Department of Eco-
nomics, Iowa State University.